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Abstract
Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at
which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower,
chooses his strategy after having observed the irrevocable commitment of the leader. Based on a result
by von Stengel and Zamir [2010], the notions of commitment value and commitment optimal strategies
for each player are discussed as a possible solution concept. It is shown that in non-degenerate bimatrix
games (a) pure commitment optimal strategies together with the follower’s best response constitute Nash
equilibria, and (b) strategies that participate in a completely mixed Nash equilibrium are strictly worse
than commitment optimal strategies, provided they are not matrix game optimal. For various classes of
bimatrix games that generalize zero sum games, the relationship between the maximin value of the leader’s
payoff matrix, the Nash equilibrium payoff and the commitment optimal value is discussed. For the Trav-
eler’s Dilemma, the commitment optimal strategy and commitment value for the leader are evaluated and
seem more acceptable as a solution than the unique Nash equilibrium. Finally, the relationship between
commitment optimal strategies and Nash equilibria in 2 × 2 bimatrix games is thoroughly examined and
in addition, necessary and sufficient conditions for the follower to be worse off at the equilibrium of the
leadership game than at any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game are provided.
Keywords: Bimatrix Game, Nash Equilibrium, Subgame Perfect, Commitment Optimal, Commitment
Value, Weakly Unilaterally Competitive Games, Pure Strategy Equilibrium,
JEL Classification: C72, AMS 2010 Subject Classification Primary: 91A05, Secondary: 91A10, 91A40.
1 Introduction
In the 1920’s, when trying to formalize zero-sum games and propose a solution concept for them, both E.
Borel and J. von Neumann approached two-person zero-sum games from an optimization point of view. As
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payoff functions depend on both players actions, direct optimization of a player’s payoff does not make sense
and both Borel and von Neumann reached the concept of the players’ security or safety level. It was defined
as the best among worst possible outcomes for that player and was to be taken as the “value of the game” for
each player1. This formulation led to the famous minimax theorem, which, stating that the values of both
players coincide, established the common value as the indisputable solution concept for these games.
To present this concept in their classic book, J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern proposed two auxiliary
games: The “minorant” game Γ1, in which player I chooses his mixed strategy x first, and then II, in full
knowledge of x (but not of its realization), chooses his mixed strategy y, and the “majorant” game Γ2, in
which the order of the players’ moves is reversed. This scheme was proposed so that the optimization of
each player’s utility would make sense:
The introduction of these two games Γ1, Γ2 achieves this: It ought to be evident by common
sense – and we shall also establish it by an exact discussion – that for Γ1, Γ2 the “best way of
playing”– i.e. the concept of rational behavior – has a clear meaning2.
Hence, to be able to use individual rationality (i.e. the maximization of a player’s utility) in deriving a
solution, a leader-follower scheme was utilized and the notion of a common safety (or security) level as the
solution evolved naturally from optimality considerations.
However, generalizing this approach to two person, non zero-sum, non-cooperative games came to a
dead end. The reason is that implicit to the Borel-von Neumann approach are three different points of view
which do not necessarily agree on (non zero-sum) bimatrix games. The first point of view is that of the
players optimizing against the worst possible outcome. For zero-sum games, individual rationality of the
opponent coincides with assuming that he is out there to destroy us, but this assumption seems unreasonable
for non-zero sum games. The second point of view is that of the players optimizing against the mixed
strategy of each other simultaneously, where both mixed strategies are considered to be known. Although
this seemed difficult to accept from the optimality point of view, it was this approach that later led to the
widely accepted Nash equilibrium concept, which addressed the problem from an equilibrium rather than
an optimization perspective. The third point of view is that of the players optimizing in a leader-follower
sequence, i.e. the follower optimizing against a known mixed strategy of the leader, and thus obtain a “value
of the game” for the leader. Applied to bimatrix games and assuming that irrevocable commitment on mixed
strategies by the players is possible, the objections one may raise to the third point of view are firstly, what
factors determine the order of play for the players and secondly, how is the leader going to optimize if the
follower has a non-unique best response?
The problems that emerge in the leader-follower approach as well as the comparison of simultaneous and
sequential move versions of the same underlying game, the latter under various assumptions on the sense of
commitment of the leader, have been a topic of continuous research in the game theory literature. What these
comparisons actually do is more or less investigating the relationship between the three “points of view” we
talked about, often for specific classes of games. Since this literature has a wide variety of themes, we will
refer only to papers related to the particular questions we examine in the present paper. All such references
are cited in detail and in context to each particular question raised in the main text. However, even if it is not
our topic, a small discussion of the rationale behind the leader-follower approach in bimatrix games and of
the two objections mentioned above should be helpful in appreciating the rest of this paper.
Rosenthal [1991] examines normal form bimatrix games and related sequential versions, where one of
the players commits to any of his (mixed) strategies and this commitment becomes known to the other player
1For a discussion of the details (sometimes controversial) of their contribution the reader is referred to Dimand and Dimand [1996],
Dimand and Ben-El-Mechaiekh [2010], and Kjeldsen [2001].
2For more on this subject, see chapters 14 and 17 of von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] – the excerpt is from p.100.
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prior to his strategy selection. Rosenthal defines commitment-robust equilibria to be Nash equilibria of the
simultaneous move game that are subgame perfect equilibria of both the related sequential move versions
and argues that Nash equilibria that fail this property ought to be questionable, if there is sufficient flexibility
in the rules of the game.
In an attempt to deal with the choice of the leader/follower, i.e. the first objection noted above, Hamilton and Slutsky
[1993] propose a two stage generated model for 2 × 2 bimatrix games that determines “endogenously”
whether the game will be played sequentially and, in that case, the ordering of the two players. Using this
model for non-degenerate bimatrix games, van Damme and Hurkens [1996] address a question related to
that raised by Rosenthal [1991]: when is an equilibrium of the original game an equilibrium of the gener-
ated game also? Such equilibria are termed “viable”. They prove that an equilibrium of the original game
in mixed strategies is viable if and only if no player has an incentive to move first in the ordinary, sequential
move, commitment game. It is clear that the Hamilton-Slutsky two stage generated model was chosen by
van Damme and Hurkens as a tool to deal with the ordering of the players. However, although the imposition
of a super-game over the original one, with its own rules and assumptions, leads to interesting results, it is
questionable whether it actually resolves the issue and should be preferable to the original setup. It is our
opinion that an answer that would settle this objection conclusively has yet to be proposed.
The second objection raised when one approaches bimatrix games by a leader-follower approach, namely
that of the leader’s choice when the follower has more than one best responses to the leader’s strategy, has
been settled by von Stengel and Zamir [2010]. Prior to that publication, the prevailing approach was to
consider either the case where the follower chooses his best response so as to accommodate the leader or
(on the contrary) he chooses his best response so as to harm the leader3. It is questionable whether both
these approaches agree with the principle of individual rationality of the follower and, anyway, they leave
the question of real play for the leader open: how could his play depend on the assumption that the follower
would play in this or that fashion? Certainly, the question pertains to degenerate bimatrix games, but yet,
ignoring degeneracy is not a satisfactory answer. Von Stengel and Zamir [2010] show that when a bimatrix
game is played sequentially with the mixed strategy of the leader being observed by the follower before he
makes his move, then all subgame perfect equilibria payoffs for the leader form a closed interval of the form
[αL, αH], where αL is a payoff that the leader can guarantee (i.e. induce the follower to give a best response
that results to αL). This interval collapses to a point when the bimatrix game is non-degenerate.
An important implication of their result is that, for bimatrix games, αL is precisely the safety level of
the leader, i.e. the “value” of the minorant game or majorant game (according to who plays first) in the
von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] sense. However, these two values will generally not be the same and
of course, a player’s payoff will be different on the inducible subgame perfect equilibrium if he plays first
or second. We shall call the safety level of the leader in the minorant game (resp. majorant) commitment
value for player I (resp. player II) and any strategy of the leader that guarantees him his commitment value
commitment optimal.
Based on these observations, there are three notions that their relationship needs to be studied further:
matrix values and corresponding max-min strategies in the individual matrix games, Nash equilibria and
their payoffs in the simultaneous move bimatrix game and finally, commitment values and commitment
optimal strategies in the minorant/majorant games.
In the present paper, we try to investigate these relationships. Our results are far from being complete,
however we got some interesting characterizations. Firstly, we derive two general properties of Nash equi-
libria and commitment optimal strategies. We show that when the leader has a pure commitment optimal
strategy in a non-degenerate leader-follower game, then this strategy together with the follower’s best re-
3For a detailed exposition of the theory developed in the latter case, see Chapter 3.6,“The Stackelberg Equilibrium Solution”, of
Basar and Olsder [1999].
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sponse form a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies in the underlying bimatrix game. Hence, if it is possible
to improve upon his Nash equilibria payoffs, the leader must use mixed strategies in the leader-follower
non-degenerate game, which underlines the importance of mixed strategies per se. This result is not true in
the case of degeneracy. Also, we show that in a non-degenerate bimatrix game a player can strictly improve
his payoff at a completely mixed Nash equilibrium by commitment, provided his Nash equilibrium strategy
is not matrix game optimal (i.e. maximin).
Secondly, taking player I to be the leader (without loss of generality) and letting vA denote the value
of the leader’s matrix game, we discuss the validity of the equation vA = αL = αH for various classes of
bimatrix games that are viewed as generalizations of zero-sum games.4 Of course, this equation is true
for zero sum games. We show that the equation obtains for weakly unilaterally competitive games, but is
false for other generalizations of zero-sum games, such us almost strictly competitive games, pre-tight, best
response equivalent to zero sum games, and strategically zero sum games. Of particular interest is the case
where the payoff at all Nash equilibria of a bimatrix game is equal to the value of the leader’s matrix game
vA but less than his commitment value. The Nash equilibrium is a questionable solution concept for such
games.
Thirdly, we discuss the game known as the Traveler’s Dilemma-TrD (see the pertinent section for refer-
ences on TrD), which is a typical example of a bimatrix game whose unique Nash equilibrium is compelling
under standard equilibrium arguments (e.g. domination of strategies) but unattractive under both optimality
considerations and common sense, and also unsupported by experimental game theory5. For the TrD, we
derive the commitment value and the commitment optimal strategy of the players (the same for both due to
symmetry), which are very close both to the Pareto optimal outcome and to the behavior of game partici-
pants in experiments. It is noteworthy that the follower’s payoff is then identical to that of the leader and
thus, the symmetry of the game is preserved by the leader-follower solution. TrD is an example of a game
where the payoff at Nash equilibria equals to the matrix game value of the leader which is strictly less than
his commitment value.
Finally, for the case of 2×2 bimatrix games, we exhaustively examine the relationship between commit-
ment optimal strategies of the leader, optimal responses of the follower and Nash equilibrium strategies of
both. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the follower to be worse off at the equilibrium
of the leadership game than at any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game.
1.1 Outline
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, formal definitions and notations for bimatrix
games and their associated leadership games are given. In addition, some results from von Stengel and Zamir
[2010] are presented, which are used subsequently. Section 3 presents properties and compares matrix game
values, Nash equilibria payoffs and commitment values. In section 4, special classes of bimatrix games that
have been proposed as generalizations of zero-sum games are examined with respect to the relationship be-
tween maximin, optimal commitment and Nash equilibria strategies. In section 4.5, we discuss the traveler’s
dilemma. Finally, section 5 is devoted to 2× 2 bimatrix games, discussing the relationship between commit-
ment optimal strategies and Nash equilibrium strategies, and also comparing the payoffs of the follower in
these two cases.
4Observe that if this equation is valid, then all Nash equilibria payoffs for the leader will also be equal to vA since, as
von Stengel and Zamir [2010] show, the payoff for the leader at any Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix game is less or equal to αH
.
5Concerning experiments on TrD, one is referred to Basu et al. [2011]. On an experiment in which the participants were members
of the Game Theory Society, see Becker et al. [2005].
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2 Definitions
We consider the mixed extension of an m×n bimatrix game (A, B) played by players I and II, which we denote
shortly by Γ. The sets of pure strategies of the players are I = {1, 2, . . . ,m}, J = {m + 1,m + 2, . . . ,m + n}
respectively. A pure strategy of player I will be denoted by si or simply by i, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, when
confusion may not arise. Similarly, a pure strategy of player II will be denoted by t j or simply by j, for
j = m + 1,m + 2, . . . ,m + n. The sets of mixed strategies of player I (resp. player II) will be denoted by
X (resp. Y), where X = ∆(m) and Y = ∆(n) are the m − 1 dimensional and n − 1 dimensional probability
simplexes. For x ∈ X and y ∈ Y, the payoffs of player I and II are given by α (x, y) := xT Ay and β (x, y) :=
xT By. The value of the matrix game of player I will be denoted by vA. It could be considered as I’s safety
level, since I may guarantee the value of the matrix game A no matter what strategy player II chooses;
however we will avoid this interpretation in view of our previous discussion on commitment value. Of
course, vA = maxx∈X min j∈J α (x, j). The corresponding quantity for player II is vB = maxy∈Y mini∈I β (i, y),
the value of BT . Given a strategy x ∈ X of player I, a strategy y of player II is a best response to x if
β (x, y) = maxy′∈Y β (x, y′). In symbols, BRII (x) := {y ∈ Y : β (x, y) ≥ β (x, y′) ,∀y′ ∈ Y}. Note, that
BRII (x) = conv
{
j ∈ J : j ∈ BRII (x)
}
. A strategy x ∈ X is strongly dominated by a strategy x′ ∈ X if
α (x′, y) > α (x, y) for all y ∈ Y and weakly dominated by a strategy x′′ ∈ X if α (x′′, y) ≥ α (x, y) for all
y ∈ Y, with strict inequality for at least one y ∈ Y.
For any j ∈ J, the best reply region of j is the set X ( j) ⊆ X on which j is a best reply, i.e. X ( j) :={
x ∈ X : j ∈ BRII (x)
}
. The sets Y (i) for i ∈ I are defined similarly. The edges of X ( j) are denoted by C ( j).
By standard convexity arguments, arg maxx∈X( j) α (x, j) ∩ C ( j) , ∅ in any bimatrix game. We say that X ( j)
is full-dimensional, if there is x ∈ X ( j) such that xi > 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, i.e. if the interior Xo ( j) is
not empty. Let D := { j ∈ J : Xo ( j) , ∅}. Von Stengel and Zamir [2004] show that j ∈ D if and only if j is
not (weakly) dominated. For j ∈ J, let E ( j) = {k ∈ J : β (·, j) ≡ β (·, k)}, i.e. E ( j) denotes the set of all pure
strategies k ∈ J, k , j, that are payoff equivalent to j.
Given a bimatrix game Γ, we consider two associated leadership (leader-follower) or commitment games,
denoted by ΓI and ΓII. We define ΓI to be the game at which player I is the leader, i.e. he moves first and
commits to a strategy, possibly mixed, and player II is the follower, i.e. he moves second, after having
observed the strategy choice of player I. Formally, the strategy set of player I is X as in Γ, while the strategy
set of player II is the set of measurable functions f : X 7→ Y. The payoffs of the players in ΓI are determined
by their payoff functions in Γ, that is α (x, f (x)) = xT A f (x) and β (x, f (x)) = xT B f (x). When considering
best replies of player II, we will usually restrict attention to pure strategies since there is no need for the
follower to employ a mixed strategy. Similarly, we define ΓII as the game where player II moves first and
player I moves second. In what follows, we use ΓI with player I as the leader in a generic fashion, but, unless
stated otherwise, results apply also to ΓII.
A bimatrix game is non-degenerate if no mixed strategy of any player has more pure best replies than
the size of its support. When considering the game ΓI we will need this property to hold only for mixed
strategies of the player that moves first, i.e. player I. This motivates the following definition
Definition 2.1. A bimatrix game Γ is non-degenerate for player i, for i = {I, II}, if no mixed strategy of player
i has more pure best replies among the strategies of player j than the size of its support.
For the leadership games ΓI (and ΓII), we use the subgame perfect equilibrium as a solution concept,
under which an optimal strategy f (·) of the follower is a best reply to any x ∈ X. For the simultaneous
move game Γ, we will be interested in Nash equilibria and, in some cases, in correlated equilibria (Aumann
[1974]) or in coarse correlated equilibria (Moulin and Vial [1978]).
A Nash equilibrium strategy profile will be denoted by
(
xN , yN
)
, with xN ∈ X and yN ∈ Y. The set of
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all Nash equilibria strategy profiles of the bimatrix game Γ will be denoted by NE (Γ) and the set of all
Nash equilibria payoffs by NEΠ (Γ). The payoffs of player I and II at a Nash equilibrium will be denoted
by αN := α
(
xN , yN
)
and βN := β
(
xN , yN
)
respectively. Finally, we write NE (X) , (NE (Y)) for the set of all
strategies of player I (resp. II) that participate in some Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game.
2.1 Existing results: equilibrium payoffs of the leader
The present work builds upon results that appeared recently in the literature, some of which we present here.
Von Stengel and Zamir [2010] prove that in a degenerate bimatrix game, the subgame perfect equilibria
payoffs of the leader form an interval
[
αL, αH
]
. The lowest leader equilibrium payoff αL is given by the
expression
αL = max
j∈D
max
x∈X( j)
min
k∈E( j)
α (x, k) (1)
and the highest leader equilibrium payoff αH is given by
αH = max
x∈X
max
j∈BRII(x)
α (x, j) = max
j∈J
max
x∈X( j)
α (x, j) (2)
If the game is non-degenerate (or non-degenerate for the leader), then the leader has a unique subgame
perfect equilibrium payoff in ΓI. In this case, the expressions in (1) and (2) coincide. In fact, less than
non-degeneracy is required for the equality (hence uniqueness) to hold. If any best reply region is full-
dimensional or empty and if there are no payoff equivalent strategies, i.e. if E ( j) = { j} for any j ∈ J, then
expression (1) yields the same value as expression (2), i.e. αL = max j∈J maxx∈X( j) α (x, j) = αH . See also
Example 3.5 in section 3.2 for such a case.
For the non-degenerate case, the intuition behind deriving the unique leader equilibrium payoff αL = αH
is the following. The leader commits to a strategy x ∈ X and the follower gives a best response, which the
leader may force to be the best possible for him among player II’s best responses. This follows from an
ǫ-argument. As a sketch, for any strategy x ∈ X that admits more that one pure best replies, player I may
sacrifice an ǫ > 0 and move to a nearby strategy that admits a unique pure best reply. Von Stengel and Zamir
[2004] call such a strategy of the follower inducible, in the sense that by sacrificing ǫ > 0 the leader may
induce the follower to use it. By the non-degeneracy property, this can be done for any pure best reply of the
follower against x, for any x ∈ X. In equilibrium there is no sacrifice and the result obtains.
In non-degenerate bimatrix games, the unique leader equilibrium payoff is identified as the highest payoff
for that player on an edge of his part of the Lemke-Howson diagram (meaning the part of the diagram on
this player’s simplex).
In games that are degenerate or at least degenerate for the leader (cf. definition 2.1), the reason for the
possible difference between the lowest (αL) and highest (αH) leader equilibrium payoff is that not all pure
best replies of the follower may be inducible. This is so for the case of weakly dominated strategies, which
have not full-dimensional best reply regions and for the case of payoff equivalent strategies which have best
reply regions that fully coincide. Again, αH corresponds to the best possible subgame equilibrium payoff
for the leader. To obtain the lowest leader payoff αL, von Stengel and Zamir [2004] reduce the original
game to a game that is non-degenerate for the leader, by ignoring his payoffs against weakly dominated
strategies and solving for his safety level against payoff equivalent strategies of the follower. The unique
leader equilibrium payoff in this reduced, non-degenerate (for the leader) game, is now the lowest payoff αL
that he may guarantee in the original leadership game.
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If l denotes the lowest and h the highest Nash equilibrium payoff of player I in Γ, von Stengel and Zamir
[2010] show that l ≤ αL and6 h ≤ αH . Together with the trivial inequality vA ≤ l ≤ h, their result establishes
lower and upper bounds for the Nash equilibria payoffs of a player. So, in degenerate games with αL < αH
vA ≤ l ≤ αL
vA ≤ l ≤ h ≤ αH
(3)
while for non-degenerate games, since αL = αH , (3) simplifies to
vA ≤ l ≤ h ≤ αL (4)
We have already noted that αL should not be viewed as the lowest subgame perfect equilibrium payoff
for the leader, but rather as his commitment value in the leadership game, i.e. a payoff that he may guarantee
assuming the other player is rational (utility maximizer).
2.2 Motivation: Safety levels and Nash equilibria payoffs
Hence, applied to bimatrix games, the optimization point of view leads to αL as a candidate for the gener-
alization of the notion of safety level. As we saw, von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] take the leader-
follower approach to discuss the safety level vA in matrix games, for which of course vA = αL. At first
sight, the payoff αL refers to a different game ΓI than the payoffs αN , vA with which we want to compare
it. However, as Conitzer [2016] argues, the leadership equilibrium should be viewed as a distinct solution
concept for the game Γ itself and not as an application of the Nash equilibrium concept on the different game
ΓI. So, one wonders whether a theory can be developed for the solution of non-zero sum games which will
not originate from the equilibrium point of view but will be based on the leader-follower approach, which
is generated from the optimization point of view. In that case, αL will play a central role for the case of
bimatrix games.
Based on our discussion thus far and on equations (3) and (4), one is motivated to raise certain questions.
Firstly, is it possible to characterize all bimatrix games for which h ≤ αL? This inequality, which already
holds for non-degenerate games, leads to discarding all Nash equilibria if the rules of the game permit
commitment, as is often the case. Certainly, in that case a new problem appears: How will the leader be
chosen among the two players? Secondly, for which classes of bimatrix games does equation (4) collapse to
vA = α
L
, i.e. the leader may not guarantee more than the safety level of his payoff matrix?
3 Nash Equilibria, maximin strategies and commitment optimal stra-
tegies
Along with the leader payoffs at subgame perfect equilibria of ΓI, we want to study his equilibrium strategies.
In agreement with the notation αL and αH , we denote by xL and xH the strategies that the leader uses to attain
these payoffs. However, xL and xH may be non-unique.
Example 3.1. In the 3 × 3 bimatrix game Γ with payoff matrices
A =

4 1 0
3 2 0
0 0 3.5
 B =

1 2 0
4 3 0
0 0 1

6The last inequality holds also for any correlated equilibrium payoff, i.e. the highest leader payoff of a player is at least as high as
his highest correlated equilibrium payoff in the simultaneous move game.
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αL = αH = 3.5, but this payoff can be achieved by player I (the leader) in ΓI with two different commitment
strategies: either xL1 =
(
1
2 ,
1
2 , 0
)
, which induces the follower to play t4 or xL2 = (0, 0, 1) which induces the
follower to play t6. This is despite the fact that the game is non-degenerate.
To proceed, we give a formal definition of commitment value and commitment optimal strategies.
Definition 3.2. Let Γ be a bimatrix game and let ΓI and ΓII be the associated leadership (leader-follower)
or commitment games, where I is the leader in ΓI and II is the leader in ΓII. Then, the leader’s inducible
lower subgame perfect equilibrium payoff αL in ΓI (resp. in ΓII) will be called commitment value for I (resp.
II). A strategy that guarantees his commitment value to a player will be called commitment optimal.
As the example above shows, the set of commitment optimal strategies for a player need not be a single-
ton. We will take player I as the “default” leader player and we will denote by XL the set of his commitment
optimal strategies, with generic element xL ∈ XL. A strategy that the leader may induce the follower to use
when playing commitment optimally7 by using xL ∈ XL will be denoted by jF (xL) and the corresponding
payoff of the follower will be denoted by βF(xL) or simply βF , i.e. βF := β
(
xL, jF (xL)
)
, where jF (xL) ∈ J
such that α
(
xL, jF (xL)
)
= αL. Notice that at different strategy pairs
(
xL, jF(xL)
)
the payoff of the leader is
constant and equal to αL but the follower may obtain different payoffs βF .
3.1 Monotonicity of the bounds: matrix game value, commitment value and equi-
libria payoffs
We start with the observation that the lower and upper bounds in relations (3) and (4), i.e. vA and αL (resp.
αH) exhibit certain monotonicity relations to the sizes of the pure strategy spaces (i.e. the number of pure
strategies) of the players. The proof is immediate from the definitions and thus ommitted.
Lemma 3.3. Let |I| = m and |J| = n be the numbers of pure strategies of player I and II respectively in a
bimatrix game Γ. Then
1. The value of the matrix game of player I in Γ, vA, is a non-decreasing function of m and a non-increasing
function of n.
2. The lowest and highest leader payoffs αL and αH of player I in ΓI are non-decreasing functions of m, but
not necessarily non-increasing in n.
3. The Nash equilibria payoffs of player I do not have a certain monotonicity relation to the number of the
player’s own strategies or to the number of the other player’s strategies.
Although obvious, Lemma 3.3 highlights an undesired property of the Nash equilibrium. Given the
strategies of his opponent, having more choices should offer a strategic advantage to a player. While this
is indeed the case in terms of the leader’s commitment value αL, his highest subgame perfect equilibrium
payoff αH , and his matrix game value vA, having more options may well be harmful in terms of his Nash
equilibria payoffs in Γ.
It is easy to construct such an example by referring to the TrD (see section 4.5). There, consider first
the game having the same payoff functions α, β, but strategy spaces I = {100}, J = {2, 3, . . . , 100} and start
increasing the strategy space of player I by adding 99, then 98, etc.
The introduction/removal of strongly dominated strategies affects these bounds in a non-trivial way. For
example, in evaluating the matrix game value vA, the min is taken against all strategies in J, including
7For a given xL , jF (xL) is actually not unique. However, on the set of those jF s the follower’s payoff is constant, so we don’t really
care about the non-uniqueness of jF (xL).
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strongly dominated strategies of player II. In view of Lemma 3.3, this means that vA may decrease by the
addition of a strongly dominated strategy to player II’s strategies.
On the other hand, Nash equilibria payoffs and leader payoffs remain unaffected if strongly dominated
strategies of the other player are introduced/removed. A more interesting case occurs when I has strategies
that are strongly dominated in Γ but not in ΓI. Such strategies do not affect vA or Nash equilibrium payoffs
αN , but may improve his leader payoff bounds [αL, αH]. This subject is addressed in detail later, see example
4.7 and section 4.5 for instances of this case.
3.2 Nash equilibria and pure commitment optimal strategies
We show that for non-degenerate bimatrix games any pure commitment optimal strategy of I, together with
II’s best response to it, constitute a Nash equilibrium of Γ. In the proof we make use of an observation by
von Stengel and Zamir [2010], namely that in a non-degenerate game any best reply region X ( j) is either
empty or full-dimensional, i.e. either X ( j) = ∅ or j ∈ D.
Proposition 3.4. If the bimatrix game Γ is non-degenerate for player I, and if I has a pure commitment
optimal strategy iL, then the strategy profile
(
iL, jF
)
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Proof. Let iL ∈ XL and let jF ∈ BRII
(
iL
)
. Since the game is non-degenerate for I, jF is unique, i.e iL <
X ( j) for any other j ∈ J, j , jF . Since iL ∈ X
(
jF
)
, X
(
jF
)
must be full-dimensional, so that for any
i ∈ I and for ǫ > 0 sufficiently small, the mixed strategy xL
ǫ,i := (1 − ǫ)
(
iL
)
+ ǫ (i) lies only in X
(
jF
)
.
Since α
(
iL, jF
)
= maxx∈X( jF) α
(
x, jF
)
and α
(
·, jF
)
is linear, we conclude that α
(
iL, jF
)
≥ α
(
xL
ǫ,i, jF
)
=
(1 − ǫ)α
(
iL, jF
)
+ ǫα
(
i, jF
)
∀i ∈ I. But then, α
(
iL, jF
)
≥ α
(
i, jF
)
∀i ∈ I, i.e. iL ∈ BRI
(
jF
)
. Hence,
(
iL, jF
)
are both best responses one to the other in Γ. 
The construction of the mixed strategies xL
ǫ,i, i ∈ I, has been employed by von Stengel and Zamir [2004]
and von Stengel and Zamir [2010] in various proofs. If the game is degenerate, then the pure strategy iL may
also belong to another X ( j) for some j ∈ J, j , jF , and the statement of Proposition 3.4 is not always true.
This is highlighted by the following example.
Example 3.5. The 3 × 2 bimatrix game Γ with pure strategy spaces I = {1, 2, 3}, J = {4, 5} and payoff
matrices (A, B)
A =

−3 2
1 −3
0 3
 B =

0 0
1 2
3 −1

has a unique Nash equilibrium
(
xN , yN
)
=
((
0, 45 ,
1
5
)
,
(
6
7 ,
1
7
))
with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
=
(
3
7 ,
7
5
)
. The pure
strategy s1 of I has two pure best replies, i.e. BRII (s1) = conv{t4, t5}, hence the game is degenerate (for
player I). Nevertheless, both best reply regions X (4) and X (5) have full dimension and therefore player I’s
equilibrium payoff in the leadership game ΓI is unique (c.f. section 2.1) and may be determined by relation
(2). The edges of the best reply regions and the corresponding payoffs for player I are
C (4) = {s1, (0, 0.8, 0.2) , s3} ,with α
(
x, jF = 4
)
x∈C(4) = {−3, 0.8, 0}
C (5) = {s1, (0, 0.8, 0.2) , s2} ,with α
(
x, jF = 5
)
x∈C(5) = {2,−1.8,−3}
giving that αL = 2, with
(
xL, jF
)
= (s1, t5) which, however, is not a pure strategy equilibrium of (A, B).
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In view of Proposition 3.4, a necessary condition for the commitment value to be strictly better than all
Nash equilibria payoffs in a non-degenerate bimatrix game, i.e. for αL > h, is that all strategies in XL are
mixed. In other words, actual mixed strategies have to be used if the leader is to improve his payoff over
all Nash equilibria. This is in line with the “concealment” interpretation of mixed strategies as expressed
in von Neumann and Morgenstern [1953] and is to be expected since the leader-follower game is precisely
the sort of game that von Neumann and O. Morgenstern were considering when arguing about the need of
concealment8.
3.3 Completely mixed Nash equilibrium strategies vs commitment optimal strate-
gies
The next property states that a player’s strategy at a Nash equilibrium is strictly dominated by his commit-
ment optimal strategy provided (a) the bimatrix game is non-degenerate, (b) the Nash equilibrium under
consideration is completely mixed, and (c) the equilibrium strategy under consideration is not matrix game
optimal (i.e. maximin).
A Nash equilibrium (xN , yN) is completely mixed if all pure strategies of both players are played with
positive probability, which implies that any i ∈ I is a best response against yN and similarly any j ∈ J is a
best response against xN . Moreover, the non-degeneracy property implies that there is no other completely
mixed equilibrium and that the supports of xN , yN have equal size, i.e. |I| = |J|.
Proposition 3.6. Let Γ be a non-degenerate bimatrix game with a completely mixed Nash equilibrium
(xN , yN), such that xN is not a matrix game optimal (maximin) strategy. Then αL > αN .
Proof. By Lemma 1 of Pruzhansky [2011], xN cannot be a column equalizer in the payoffmatrix A of player
I, since otherwise xN would be a maximin strategy. Hence, there exist j1, j2 in J such that α(xN , j1) > αN >
α(xN , j2). Since, j1 is inducible by the non-degeneracy property, the point α(xN , j1) constitutes a payoff that
player I can guarantee for himself in ΓI and hence αL ≥ α(xN , j1). 
Example 5.6 describes a game where Proposition 3.6 holds for both players. If xN is maximin then an
improvement may not be possible, as in the 2 × 2 matrix game of matching pennies. In case Proposition
3.6 applies, the strategy profile (xN , j1) Pareto-dominates the completely mixed Nash equilibrium, since by
construction, α(xN , j1) > aN and β(xN , j1) = bN .
4 Commitment value and Nash equilibria payoffs in generalizations
of matrix games
Many classes of games that extend two-person zero-sum games have been studied in the literature. Among
others, one is referred to Aumann [1961], Kats and Thisse [1992], Moulin and Vial [1978] and Beaud [2002],
who generalize zero-sum games in different ways (see the review by Viossat [2006]). A natural question is
whether all three solution concepts (i.e. matrix game value, Nash equilibria payoffs, and commitment value)
coincide on such generalizations, as is the case for zero-sum games, i.e whether
vA = α
L = αH . (5)
8The need for actually mixing pure strategies originates from the optimization point of view, while the Bayesian interpretation of
mixing as uncertainty on a player’s type by the other players originates from the equilibrium point of view. More on the interpretation
of mixed strategies can be found in Reny and Robson [2004].
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Of interest is also the case where all Nash equilibria payoffs of the leader are equal to his matrix game value,
but his commitment value is strictly higher, i.e.
vA = h < αL. (6)
In section 4.2, it is shown that (5) is true for the class of weakly unilaterally competitive (wuc) games,
firstly defined by Kats and Thisse [1992]. The wuc games strictly include the classes of zero-sum and strictly
competitive games. Recently, interest in wuc games was reignited in view of the sufficient conditions for the
existence of pure strategy equilibria in such games that were given by Iimura and Watanabe [2016].
Equation (5) is also valid in the class of a-cooperative games. However, for other generalizations of
zero-sum games, namely pre-tight, best response equivalent to zero-sum, and almost strictly competitive
games, (5) is not valid. Equation vA = h holds in some of these classes and then (6) may be true in certain
cases (for details see section 4.4).
Classes generalizing zero sum games which satisfy (5), such as wuc or a-cooperative games, retain the
flavor of pure antagonism that characterizes zero-sum games. All solution concepts on them coincide and
no controversies on what constitutes an optimal behavior for the players may arise. On the other hand, we
expect Nash equilibrium to be a questionable solution concept for games in classes generalizing zero sum
games which satisfy (6). Such “bad behavior” cases may be found in the class of pre-tight games, a typical
example being the TrD. For a detailed exposition see 4.4 and 4.5.
4.1 A sufficient condition
Here we examine conditions under which equation (5) is valid. Obviously this obtains, if
max
j∈BRII(x)
α (x, j) = min
j∈J
α (x, j) , ∀x ∈ X (7)
Also, if there exists some x0 ∈ X such that
max
j∈BRII(x0)
α (x0, j) = minj∈J α (x0, j) ≥ maxj∈BRII(x) α (x, j) , ∀x ∈ X, (8)
then, the left hand side of (8) is αH and since vA = maxx∈X min j∈J α (x, j) ≥ min j∈J α (x0, j) = αH , we
conclude that (8) is sufficient to get vA = αL = αH , i.e (5).
Example 4.1. The 2 × 2 bimatrix game with payoff matrices
A =
(
1 0
−2 −10
)
B =
(
0 1
1 0
)
satisfies condition (8), but not (7) in ΓI.
4.2 Leader payoffs in wuc games
We now turn our attention to two person weakly unilaterally competitive (wuc) games.
Definition 4.2. A bimatrix game Γ is weakly unilaterally competitive, if for all x1, x2 ∈ X and all y ∈ Y
α (x1, y) > α (x2, y) =⇒ β (x1, y) ≤ β (x2, y)
α (x1, y) = α (x2, y) =⇒ β (x1, y) = β (x2, y)
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and similarly if for all y1, y2 ∈ Y and all x ∈ X
β (x, y1) > β (x, y2) =⇒ α (x, y1) ≤ α (x, y2)
β (x, y1) = β (x, y2) =⇒ α (x, y1) = α (x, y2)
Beaud [2002] observes that the classes of two-person zero-sum, strictly competitive (sc), unilaterally
competitive (uc) and weakly unilaterally competitive (wuc) bimatrix games satisfy the inclusion relation
(zero-sum) ( (sc) ( (uc) ( (wuc). As an immediate consequence of the definition, wuc games satisfy the
sufficient condition (7), and thus the leader’s equilibrium payoff is unique and both the commitment value
and all Nash equilibria payoffs are equal to the matrix game value. Formally,
Proposition 4.3. In a wuc game Γ, the leader’s payoff at any subgame perfect equilibrium of the commitment
game is equal to his commitment value which is equal to his matrix game value, i.e. vA = αL = αH and
vB = β
L = βH . Moreover, all Nash equilibria payoffs of the wuc game are equal to the matrix game values,
i.e. (αN , βN) = (vA, vB) for all (xN , yN).
Proof. By Definition 4.2, we have that for any x ∈ X and any j1, j2, k ∈ J with j1, j2 ∈ BRII (x) and
k < BRII (x)
β (x, j1) = β (x, j2) =⇒ α (x, j1) = α (x, j2)
β (x, j1) > β (x, k ) =⇒ α (x, j1) ≤ α (x, k )
which together imply that max j∈BRII(x) α (x, j) = min j∈J α (x, j), i.e (7) is satisfied. Similarly, using the first
part of Definition 4.2, the result follows for player II. The second part of the proposition, already known in
the literature, follows trivially from the inclusion of Nash equilibria payoffs between the matrix game values
and the highest subgame perfect equilibrium payoff αH (resp. βH) of the commitment game. 
Van Damme and Hurkens [1996] derive a result similar to our Proposition 4.3 for the class of strictly
competitive games, which, as we have seen, is a subclass of wuc games.
Note: Proposition 4.3 can be generalized for N-player wuc games, N > 2. Such games are defined simi-
larly to Definition 4.2 (see Kats and Thisse [1992]). Also, for N-player games, the corresponding leadership
game Γ1, is defined similarly: in the first stage, the leader (say, player 1) commits to a mixed strategy and
in the second stage, the remaining N − 1 players simultaneously choose their strategies knowing the mixed
strategy of the leader. So, take Γ to be a wuc N-player game and let Γ(x) be the sub-game where player
1 has fixed his mixed strategy x. Then, Γ(x) is also a wuc game. Let Y = ∏Ni=2 Yi be the set of mixed
uncorrelated strategy profiles of the followers and let Y(x) be the set of strategies of the followers that are
at equilibrium in Γ(x). By a result of de Wolf [1999] for N player wuc games, if α(x, y) denotes player 1’s
payoff in Γ(x), then, α (x, y1) = α (x, y2) = miny∈Y for any y1, y2 ∈ Y (x), i.e. for each x, player 1’s payoff is
constant over all equilibrium strategies of the followers in Γ(x) and it is the worse possible outcome for him
over all mixed strategies of the followers. But then, maxy∈Y(x) α (x, y) = miny∈Y α (x, y) which implies that
maxx∈X maxy∈Y(x) α (x, y) = maxx∈X miny∈Y α (x, y).
4.3 Games of common interest
Opposite to bimatrix games resembling zero-sum games stand games where there is a strong motivation for
the cooperation of the two players. In such games we may get the equality of αL and αH by a condition
opposite to (7), namely
max
j∈BRII(x)
α (x, j) = max
j∈J
α (x, j) , ∀x ∈ X (9)
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This condition guarantees that αH = maxi, j α (i, j), since maxx∈X max j∈J α (x, j) = maxi, j α (i, j) and there-
fore (9) is sufficient to get αL = maxi, j α (i, j) for non-degenerate games. For degenerate games though, this
is not the case as the next example shows.
Example 4.4. The 2 × 2 bimatrix game with payoff matrices
A =
(
−1 2
−2 0
)
B =
(
1 1
1 1
)
satisfies condition (9) for player I, but αL = −1 < αH = 2 = maxi j α (i, j).
An alternative sufficient condition for αL to be equal to αH is the existence of an x0 ∈ X such that αH is
acquired at x0 and α (x0, j) is constant on BRII (x0). Then, min j∈BRII(x0) α (x0, j) ≥ max j∈BRII(x) α (x, j) for all
x ∈ X, and hence αL ≥ min j∈BRII(x0) α (x0, j) ≥ αH , which of course implies αL = αH . This condition is not
sufficient to guarantee αH = maxi, j α (i, j), as the following example shows
Example 4.5. The 2 × 3 bimatrix game with payoff matrices
A =
(
3 0 0
0 2 4
)
B =
(
3 0 −1
0 2 −1
)
satisfies the relaxed condition for player I, hence αL = αH = 3, but 3 < 4 = maxi j α (i, j).
4.4 Other generalizations of zero-sum games and some counterexamples
The result of Proposition 4.3 does not apply to other generalizations of zero-sum games that have been
studied in the literature. Such generalizations include the class of a-cooperative games, which is studied in
a setting similar to ours by D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [1980], the class of almost strictly competitive
games (asc) introduced by Aumann [1961], the class of pre-tight games, Viossat [2006], and the class of
strategically zero-sum games, Moulin and Vial [1978]. We provide the main definitions of these classes for
bimatrix games, but for the general case one is referred to the relevant works.
Let Γ be a bimatrix game with strategy spaces X, Y and payoff functions α, β. A twisted equilibrium
of Γ is a Nash equilibrium of the game ˜Γ, which is played over the same strategy spaces X, Y with payoff
functions α˜ := −β and ˜β := −α. We denote with T E (Γ) and T EΠ (Γ) the sets of twisted equilibria and
twisted equilibria payoffs of Γ. A pair of strategies (xs, ys) is a called saddle-point of Γ, if
α (x, ys) ≤ α (xs, ys) ≤ α (xs, y) and β (xs, y) ≤ β (xs, ys) ≤ β (x, ys)
for all x ∈ X, y ∈ Y. We denote with S (Γ) the set of saddle points of Γ. For every bimatrix game, S (Γ) =
NE (Γ) ∩ T E (Γ). A pair of strategies (x, y) is Pareto-optimal if there is no other pair of strategies (x′, y′)
giving at least as much to every player and more to some player.
A bimatrix game Γ is a-cooperative if it has at least one Pareto-optimal twisted equilibrium. A bimatrix
game Γ is almost strictly competitive (asc) if S (Γ) , ∅ and NEΠ (Γ) = T EΠ (Γ).
Similarly to wuc games, see section 4.2, D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [1980] and Beaud [2002] ob-
serve that the classes of zero-sum, a-cooperative and asc bimatrix games satisfy the inclusion relation
(zero-sum) ( (a-cooperative) ( (asc). Over asc games, Nash equilibria payoffs of the simultaneous move
game are constant and equal to the players’ matrix game values, i.e. (αN , βN) = (vA, vB) for all (xN , yN) of
the simultaneous move game.
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In any two-person asc game the unique Nash equilibrium payoff is also the unique twisted equilibrium
payoff. D’Aspremont and Ge´rard-Varet [1980] use this property to prove that in any a-cooperative game,
both leaders in the associated leadership games will commit to Nash equilibrium strategies of the simulta-
neous move game and consequently they will receive their matrix game values, i.e. for a-cooperative games
(5) is true.
However, this property does not extend to the class of asc games. As shown below (see section 4.5), the
TrD is an asc game in which both players strictly improve their payoffs in the associated leadership games.
In particular, (6) is true for TrD.
Viossat [2006] defines and studies the class of pre-tight games. A pure strategy i (resp. j) of player I
(resp.II) is called coherent if it is played in a correlated equilibrium of Γ. A bimatrix game Γ is called pre-
tight if in any correlated equilibrium all the incentive constraints for non deviating to a coherent strategy are
tight. Viossat [2006] notes that the class of two-player pre-tight games strictly contains two player zero-sum
games and games with a unique correlated equilibrium. TrD, has a unique correlated equilibrium and thus
provides an example that in a pre-tight game, contrary to zero-sum games, the leader and the follower may
strictly improve their payoffs in the associated leadership games ΓI and ΓII.
Moulin and Vial [1978] define strategically zero-sum bimatrix games, which strictly contain zero-sum
and strictly competitive games. A bimatrix game Γ with payoff matrices (A, B) is strategically zero-sum if it
is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game, i.e. if there exists a matrix game with payoff functions c,−c
on the same strategy spaces, such that α (x′, y) ≥ α (x, y) ⇐⇒ c (x′, y) ≥ c (x, y) for all x, x′ ∈ X, y ∈ Y and
β (x, y′) ≥ β (x, y) ⇐⇒ c (x, y′) ≤ c (x, y) for all x ∈ X, y, y′ ∈ Y. Additionally, they define the concept of a
trivial game for a player and show that every 2 × 2 bimatrix game that is trivial for a player is strategically
zero-sum. They show that any strategically zero-sum game is best response equivalent9 to a zero-sum game
and provide sufficient conditions for the converse to be true. They also show that in strategically zero-sum
games a Nash equilibrium exists that dominates payoff-wise all other Nash equilibria of the simultaneous
game.
Example 4.6 shows that in the class of strategically zero-sum games αL may be strictly greater than the
payoff of the leader at the dominant Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous game.
Example 4.6. Let Γ be the 2 × 2 bimatrix game
A =
(
2 −1
3 0
)
B =
(
2 1
−1 0
)
Then, strategy s1 of player I is strictly dominated, thus the game is trivial for player I according to the
triviality concept of Moulin and Vial [1978]. The only Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game
is (xN , yN) = (s2, t2) with payoffs (αN , βN) = (0, 0). In ΓI, αL = αH and player’s I equilibrium strategy is
xL = (0.5, 0.5) which induces player II to play t3. The resulting unique equilibrium yields payoffs (αL, βF) =
(2.5, 0.5).
While best response equivalent games have the same set of Nash equilibria, the equilibria of their asso-
ciated leadership games may differ. This is highlighted in the following example.
Example 4.7. Let Γ be the 2 × 2 bimatrix game
A =
(
3 10
1 9
)
B =
(
3 1
8 9
)
9Two games are best response equivalent if they have the same best response correspondence, see Rosenthal [1974].
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and Γ′ the bimatrix game
A′ =
(
3 2
1 1
)
B′ = B
Γ′ results from Γ by the affine transformation α′ (·, t4) = α (·, t4) − 8. Γ and Γ′ are best response equivalent,
since the best reply regions Y (i) , Y′ (i) for i = 1, 2 and X ( j) , X′ ( j) for j = 3, 4 are
Y (1) = Y′ (1) = Y, Y (2) = Y′ (2) = ∅
X (3) = X′ (3) =
[
1
3 , 1
]
, X (4) = X′ (4) =
[
0, 13
]
and hence they have the same set of Nash equilibria, which is the singleton (s1, t3) with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
=
(3, 3). However, the unique leader equilibrium of ΓI is
(
xL, jF
)
=
((
1
3 ,
2
3
)
, t4
)
,
(
αL, βF
)
=
(
9 13 , 6
1
3
)
while the unique leader equilibrium of Γ′I is
(
x′L, j′F
)
= (s1, t3) ,
(
α′L, β′F
)
= (3, 3)
4.5 Traveler’s dilemma
Traveler’s dilemma (TrD) was first introduced by Basu [1994] and quickly attracted widespread attention as
a game where rationality leads to a difficult to accept Nash equilibrium solution. In TrD, the equilibrium
solutions of the simultaneous game and of the associated leadership games differ significantly. Notably,
the associated leadership equilibria strategies are much closer to the behavior of the players, as observed in
experiments, than the unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game. This discrepancy generates
a strong motivation to study leadership games.
TrD is a symmetric bimatrix game with strategy spaces I = J = {2, 3, . . . , 99, 100} and payoffs
α (i, j) = β ( j, i) =

i + 2, i < j
i, i = j
j − 2, i > j
The best reply correspondence of player I against j ∈ J is
BRI ( j) =

j − 1, j > 2
2, j = 2
and similarly for player II. The game can be solved with the process of iterated elimination of strongly
dominated strategies (iesds) and hence it has the fictitious play property (see Monderer and Shapley [1996]).
In the first round of elimination, the pure strategy (100) is strongly dominated by the mixed strategy xǫ :=
(1 − ǫ) (99) + ǫ (2) (for 0 < ǫ < 197 ) and hence eliminated. The process of iesds successively deletes all
strategies except the pure strategy (2), which results to the pure strategy profile (x, y) = (2, 2) being the
unique Nash equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium (2, 2) survives any Nash equilibrium refinement concept.
It is also the unique correlated equilibrium and the unique rationalizable strategy profile10, implying that
10See Bernheim [1984] and Pearce [1984] for the definition of rationalizable strategic behavior.
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neither correlation nor rationalizability may improve upon this Nash equilibrium. The TrD has attracted
interest mostly due to the fact that this unique solution, although having a very strong theoretical argument
in its favor since it is derived by iesds, is inefficient in terms of the social welfare, counter-intuitive and
differs significantly from the observed behavior of the players in conducted experiments. In the penultimate
round of elimination the game corresponds to a prisoner’s dilemma
A =
(
3 0
4 2
)
B =
(
3 4
0 2
)
Hence, TrD may be viewed as a generalization of prisoner’s dilemma to n strategies. Contrary to the intuition
that cooperation should be beneficial for both players, this is not the case as TrD turns out to be an almost
strictly competitive game, since
1. S (Γ) = {(2, 2)}
2. NEΠ (Γ) = T EΠ (Γ) = {2, 2}
a fact that forces the players’ payoffs to their matrix game values. TrD resembles Bertrand duopoly, an
observation made already in Basu [1994]. Halpern and Pass [2012] apply their new solution concept of
iterated regret minimization to TrD and derive a satisfactory solution.
Although correlated equilibrium or rationalizability do not improve upon the Nash equilibrium outcome
in TrD, coarse correlation and leadership significantly do so. It is straightforward to check that the distribu-
tion
(
zi j
)
(i, j)∈I×J with
zi j =

1
2 , i = j = 100, and i = j = 98 ( or i = j = 97) ,
0, else
is a symmetric coarse correlated equilibrium, with payoffs equal to 99 (or 98.5) for each player. Note that
starting from this distribution, one may see that there exists a great multitude of coarse correlated equilibria
in TrD. However, the Pareto-optimal outcome (100, 100) is not a coarse correlated equilibrium.
The unique equilibrium of ΓI (commitment optimal strategy of the leader and optimal response of the
follower) may be calculated by equation (2) after considerable simplifications in the strategy spaces and is
given by
xL =
1
3
(100) + 13 (99) +
1
3
(97) , jF = (99)
with payoffs αL = βF = 98 13 . The leader-follower approach to a solution concept works well for TrD
since payoffs are the same for both players, irrespective of who moves first, and they are very close to
the Pareto optimal outcome. In other words, if the rules of the game permit commitment, one expects the
leader-follower equilibrium to prevail over the Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game.
5 2 × 2 bimatrix games
In bimatrix games, where I = {1, 2} and J = {3, 4}, we may derive some special properties for the associated
leadership games. Let the payoff matrices (A, B) be
A =
(
a1 a2
a3 a4
)
B =
(
b1 b2
b3 b4
)
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In this case, when solving ΓI, the possible edges of the best reply regions X (3) and X (4) are C (3) ∪C (4) ={
s1, x
d, s2
}
, where xd := (1 − d, d) denotes the equalizing strategy of player I over player II’s payoffs with
d := b1 − b2b1 − b2 + b4 − b3
, if b1 − b2 + b4 − b3 , 0 and 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 .
Similarly, in ΓII the possible edges of the best reply regions Y (1) and Y (2) are C (1) ∪ C (2) = {t3, yc, t4},
where yc := (1 − c, c) denotes the equalizing strategy of player II over player I’s payoffs, i.e.
c :=
a4 − a3
a1 − a2 + a4 − a3
, if a1 − a2 + a4 − a3 , 0 and 0 ≤ c ≤ 1 .
For a 2×2 bimatrix game that is degenerate for the leader11, we first show that a stronger statement than that
of Proposition 3.4 holds, namely that any commitment optimal strategy xL is a Nash equilibrium strategy of
the simultaneous move game.
Lemma 5.1. If a 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ is degenerate for the leader, then XL ⊆ NE (X).
Proof. If the game is degenerate for player I, then player II has either a weakly dominated strategy or two
payoff equivalent strategies.
In the first case, assume the weakly dominated strategy is t4. This implies X (3) = X, Xo (4) = ∅, D = {t3}
and hence by equation (1),
αL = max
j∈D
{
max
x∈X( j)
min
k∈E( j)
α (x, k)
}
= max
x∈X(3)
α (x, t3) = max
x∈X
α (x, t3)
which implies that XL = arg maxx∈X α (x, t3) = BRI (t3). Thus, any strategy that guarantees player I his
payoff αL in ΓI is a best response against t3, which together with X (3) = X implies that
(
xL, t3
)
is a Nash
equilibrium in the simultaneous move game for all xL ∈ XL, i.e. that XL ⊆ NE (X).
On the other hand, if t3 and t4 are payoff equivalent, then X (3) = X (4) = X and E (t3) = {t3, t4}. By
equation (1), αL = max j∈J
{
maxx∈X min j∈J α (x, j)
}
= vA. Obviously, any strategy xL ∈ XL that guarantees
player I his safety level is not a strongly dominated strategy. Since strongly dominated strategies and strate-
gies that are never best responses coincide in bimatrix games, any xL ∈ XL must be a best response against
some y ∈ Y, which together with Y = BRII (x) for any x ∈ X, implies XL ⊆ NE (X). 
The statement of Lemma 5.1 is not true if we consider xH instead of xL.
Example 5.2. The 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ with payoff matrices
A =
(
4 2
3 1
)
B =
(
1 2
0 0
)
has a unique Nash equilibrium which is given by
(
xN , yN
)
= (s1, t4), with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
= (2, 2). This is
also αL for player I in ΓI. However, xH = s2 with payoff equal to αH = 3, where s2 is obviously not a Nash
equilibrium strategy as it is strongly dominated by s1.
For a 2×2 bimatrix game that is non-degenerate for the leader, we may partially strengthen the statement
of Proposition 3.4. In these games, commitment optimal strategies are Nash equilibrium strategies provided
that no pure strategy of the leader is strongly dominated.
11Without loss of generality, we henceforth assume that the leader is player I.
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Lemma 5.3. If a 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ is non-degenerate for the leader and no pure strategy of the leader
is strongly dominated, then XL ⊆ NE (X).
Proof. If player II has a strongly dominated strategy, say t4, then X (3) = X, X (4) = ∅, αL = maxx∈X α (x, t3)
and the result follows as in the previous Lemma. If player II has no strongly dominated strategy, then non-
degeneracy implies that the payoffs of B satisfy b1 > b2 and b3 < b4 (if necessary by rearranging B). Hence,
X (3) =
[
s1, x
d
]
and X (4) =
[
xd, s2
]
, and by equation (1), αL = max
 max
x∈ [s1,xd]
α (x, t3), max
x∈ [xd ,s2]
α (x, t4)
. If
XL ⊆ I, then XL ⊆ NE (X) by Proposition 3.4. If XL = X, then α (x, y) must be constant over X, Y and the
assertion holds trivially. If XL =
[
s1, x
d
]
, then a1 = a3 > a4, hence BRI (t3) = X and the assertion follows.
Similarly, if XL =
[
xd, s2
]
. Finally, if XL =
{
xd
}
, then the pair of equalizing strategies
(
xd, yc
)
is a Nash
equilibrium of Γ and the assertion follows. Notice that in this last case the existence of yc is guaranteed by
the assumption that player I has no strongly dominated strategy. 
The next Lemma provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a commitment optimal strategy of
a player not to be a Nash equilibrium strategy in a non-degenerate 2 × 2 bimatrix game. If the condition
obtains, then all commitment optimal strategies of the other player are Nash equilibrium strategies.
Lemma 5.4. If a 2×2 bimatrix game Γ is non-degenerate for the leader, then he may obtain his commitment
value αL using a strategy xL < NE (X) if and only if he has both
(ℓ1) a strongly dominated strategy in Γ and
(ℓ2) an equalizing strategy xd = (1 − d, d) over the follower’s payoffs, such that α
(
xd, j
)
≥ αN for some
j ∈ J.
Then, in game ΓII, YL = NE (Y).
Proof. Let (ℓ1) and (ℓ2) be true and take s1 to be the strongly dominated strategy of the leader, i.e. a3 > a1
and a4 > a2. Since player I has an equalizing strategy xd over player II’s payoffs, player II has no strongly
dominated strategy. Since the game is non-degenerate for the leader, player II has no weakly dominated
strategy. So, by rearranging if necessary, b1 > b2 and b3 < b4. This game has a unique Nash equilibrium
which is the pure strategy profile (s2, t4) with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
= (a4, b4), hence NE (X) = {s2}. The edges
of the best reply regions of player II are: C (3) ∪C (4) =
{
s1, x
d, s2
}
with corresponding payoffs for player I
α (x, t3)x∈C(3) = {a1, (1 − d) a1 + da3} = {a1, a1 + d (a3 − a1)}
α (x, t4)x∈C(4) = {(1 − d) a2 + da4, a4} = {a4 + (1 − d) (a2 − a4) , a4}
Now, a3 > a1 implies a1 + d (a3 − a1) > a1 and a4 > a2 implies a4 + (1 − d) (a2 − a4) < a4, hence αL =
max
{
α
(
xd, t3
)
, α (s2, t4)
}
= max {a1 + d (a3 − a1) , a4}. Therefore, by (ℓ2), xd ∈ XL.
For the converse, if xL < NE (X), by Proposition 3.4, xL may not be a pure strategy. By Lemma 5.3,
player I must have a strongly dominated strategy. But then, proceeding as above, we conclude that (ℓ2) must
also be true.
Finally, to show that YL = NE (Y) in ΓII, observe that since player I has a strongly dominated strategy,
if the roles of the players are reversed and II becomes leader, then he obtains βL in ΓII by using any of his
Nash equilibrium strategies of the simultaneous move game. 
Combining the results of Lemmas 5.1, 5.3, and 5.4, we obtain a clear picture of the relationship between
Nash equilibria of the simultaneous move game Γ and commitment optimal strategies in the leader-follower
games ΓI and ΓII.
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Proposition 5.5. In a 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ: (a) If either ΓI is degenerate for player I or ΓII is degenerate
for player II , then both XL ⊆ NE (X) and YL ⊆ NE (Y). (b) If both ΓI is non-degenerate for player I and ΓII
is non-degenerate for player II , then either (i) in ΓI there exists xL < NE (X) and in ΓII, YL = NE (Y) or (ii)
in ΓII there exists yL < NE (Y) and in ΓI, XL = NE (X) or (iii) XL ⊆ NE (X) and YL ⊆ NE (Y).
Proof. Using Lemma 5.1, for part (a) it suffices to show that if Γ is degenerate for player I, then YL ⊆ NE (Y).
To show this, it is sufficient to show that condition (ℓ1) of Lemma 5.4 never obtains when player II is a
leader (i.e in ΓII). This is true since the assumption that the game is degenerate for player I implies that II
has no strictly dominated strategy (II has either a weakly dominated strategy or his two strategies are payoff
equivalent). For part (b), it suffices to show that conditions (ℓ1) and (ℓ2) may not obtain at the same time for
ΓI and ΓII. Indeed, if player I has a strictly dominated strategy (i.e. (ℓ1) is true for player I in ΓI), then player
II may may not have an equalizing strategy over player I’s payoffs (i.e. (ℓ2) may not be true for player II in
ΓII), and if player I has an equalizing strategy over player II’s payoffs in ΓI, then player II may not have a
strictly dominated strategy in Γ. 
A statement related to Proposition 5.5 under a specific context can be found in von Stengel [2016].
Proposition 5.5 does not imply that the commitment value αL coincides with the leader’s Nash equilibrium
payoff in the simultaneous move game when XL ⊆ NE (X). It may be the case that xL induces the follower
to use the most favourable best reply for the leader. In that case, the leader will get a higher payoff in ΓI than
in Γ.
Example 5.6. The 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ with payoff matrices
A =
(
4 1
3 2
)
B =
(
1 2
4 3
)
is non-degenerate and hence the leader’s equilibrium payoff is unique in both associated leadership games
ΓI and ΓII. The unique Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game is
(
xN , yN
)
= ((0.5, 0.5) , (0.5, 0.5))
with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
= (2.5, 2.5). In ΓI, the leader commits to his Nash equilibrium strategy, i.e. xL = xN ,
however he may induce the follower to use t3 and hence αL = 3.5 > αN = 2.5, despite the fact that xL = xN .
The same is true for player II in ΓII.
The statement of Proposition 5.5 does not hold in 2 × n bimatrix games with n > 2.
Example 5.7. The 2 × 3 bimatrix game Γ
A =
(
3 2 0
1 4 −1
)
B =
(
−2 −1 0
3 −2 2
)
has a unique Nash equilibrium
(
xN , yN
)
= (s1, t5) with payoffs
(
αN , βN
)
= (0, 0). Since (A, B) is non-
degenerate, the leaders’ equilibria payoffs are unique in ΓI and ΓII. In ΓI,
(
xL, jF
)
=
((
1
3 ,
2
3
)
, t3
)
with(
αL, βF
)
=
(
5
3 ,
4
3
)
and xL < NE (X). Similarly in ΓII,
(
yL, iF
)
= ((0.5, 0.5, 0) , s1) with
(
βL, αF
)
= (0.5, 2.5)
and yL < NE (Y).
5.1 Follower payoffs in non-degenerate 2 × 2 bimatrix games
Von Stengel and Zamir [2004] provide an example of a parametric 3×3 bimatrix game which shows that the
follower’s payoff may be worse or better than his Nash equilibrium payoff in the simultaneous move game.
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For the 2×2 bimatrix case, one may use Proposition 5.5 and derive conditions that determine the relationship
between the follower’s equilibrium payoff in ΓI and his Nash equilibria payoffs in Γ. The derivation of similar
conditions for higher dimension cases is open.
So, consider a 2 × 2 non-degenerate bimatrix game Γ and recall from section 3 that for each xL ∈ XL,
the corresponding follower’s payoff is βF := β(xL, jF), where jF ∈ J such that α(xL, jF ) = αL. Since
jF ∈ BRII(xL), we have βF = max j∈J β(xL, j) ≥ minx∈X max j∈J β (x, j) = vB, i.e. any equilibrium payoff of
the follower in ΓI is at least as high as his matrix game value (obviously, this is true for any bimatrix game
and not just for 2 × 2).
If xL ∈ NE (X), then the follower’s payoff βF against xL in ΓI is equal to his payoff in some Nash
equilibrium of Γ (the one of which xL is a component). On the other hand, if there exists xL < NE (X), then
the corresponding follower’s payoff βF may be lower than any βN ∈ NEΠ (Y). However, by Lemmas 5.3
and 5.4, this may occur only under conditions (ℓ1) and (ℓ2).
Proposition 5.8. In a non-degenerate 2 × 2 bimatrix game Γ, if conditions (ℓ1) and (ℓ2) hold for player
I in ΓI, then there exists an equilibrium payoff βF of the follower in ΓI that is lower than his unique Nash
equilibrium payoff in Γ (i.e. βF < βN) if and only if vB < βN . If (ℓ2) holds with strict inequality, then this βF
is the unique equilibrium payoff of the follower.
Proof. By Lemma 5.4, in a 2 × 2 non-degenerate bimatrix game, there exists xL < NE (X) if and only if
conditions (ℓ1) and (ℓ2) hold. In this case, as shown in the proof of Lemma 5.4, one may assume – if
necessary by rearranging the order of strategies in I, J – that a3 > a1, a4 > a2 and b1 > b2, b3 < b4 and the
only Nash equilibrium of Γ is the strategy pair (s2, t4) with payoffs (a4, b4). The safety level vB of player II
in Γ is given by
vB = min
x∈X
max
j∈J
β (x, j) = min
{
b1, βd, b4
}
where βd denotes player II’s payoff against player I’s equalizing strategy, which is constant over y ∈ Y and
equal to βd = det(B)b1+b4−b2−b3 . Additionally, (ℓ2) implies that xd ∈ XL, (if (ℓ2) holds strictly, XL =
{
xd
}
). In any
case, xd < NE (X). The payoff βFof the follower against xd is equal to βd. Hence, βF < βN implies vB < βN .
For the other direction, if vB < βN (= b4), then either βd < b4 (and hence βF < βN) or b1 < b4. In the latter
case, since βF = βd = β
(
xd, t3
)
= b1 + d (b3 − b1), b1 < b4, b3 < b4, and b4 = βN , we again conclude that
βF < βN . 
If both players are better off in ΓI or in ΓII than in any Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game,
we may reason that they will have a strong incentive to play the game sequentially with the specified order,
casting doubt to the Nash equilibrium as a possible outcome/solution concept for the game.
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